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Moran processes are often used to model selection in evolutionary simulations. The updating rule in Moran
processes is a birth-death process, i. e., selection according to fitness of an individual to give birth, followed by
the death of a random individual. For well-mixed populations with only two strategies this updating rule is known
to be equivalent to selecting unfit individuals for death and then selecting randomly for procreation (biased
death-birth process). It is, however, known that this equivalence does not hold when considering structured
populations. Here we study whether changing the updating rule can also have an effect in well-mixed populations
in the presence of more than two strategies and high mutation rates. We find, using three models from different
areas of evolutionary simulation, that the choice of updating rule can change model results. We show, e. g., that
going from the birth-death process to the death-birth process can change a public goods game with punishment
from containing mostly defectors to having a majority of cooperative strategies. From the examples given we
derive guidelines indicating when the choice of the updating rule can be expected to have an impact on the results
of the model.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Evolutionary models are used to explore a diverse range of
research topics from cancer cell spread [1] and particle systems
[2] to the evolution of language traits [3] and cooperation
[4]. As such, results from these models greatly inform our
characterization of many systems, with implications for how
we view the world and our own social behavior. Predictions
and policies are based on findings from evolutionary game
theory [5,6]. Given this, an awareness of how implicit
assumptions in evolutionary models can impact their outcomes
is vital.
The underlying framework of any evolutionary model
must incorporate an updating rule. This describes the core
evolutionary properties of the system to be explored. In this
work, we consider how different updating rule formulations
can lead to varied model results, while appearing to capture
similar evolutionary properties. Our focus is on a subtlety of
the implementation of selection—whether fitness advantage is
rewarded by increased survival or increased reproduction.
There is a small number of updating rules regularly
employed in models with fixed population size. We focus on
three of these (birth process, death process, and link dynamics)
as described below. We postpone their formal definition and
detailed description to Sec. II.
Other updating rules have also been used to model evolu-
tionary processes, but much more rarely. The three updating
rules compared in this article are based on replication (or
imitation) of one individual in each time step. It is known that
other families of updating rules, such as myopic best response,
can lead to entirely different evolutionary dynamics [7,8].
Moran [9] introduced a class of evolutionary models which
employ an updating rule known as the birth-death process
(BP) [10] or (biased) invasion process [11]. In these models, the
fitness of an individual gives the probability that this individual
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produces offspring in a given time step. This type of model is
intermediate between the discrete-time Wright-Fisher model
[12], in which one time step corresponds to one generation of
the finite population, and continuous-time approaches using
differential equations and infinite populations. The Moran
process permits the study of overlapping generations in a finite
population of fixed size, using a discrete-time Markov chain.
The transition probabilities associated with the birth-death
process have comparatively easy algebraic expressions (see,
e. g., Ref. [3]) and are therefore often used where algebraic
expressions of derived properties like fixation probabilities are
relevant. The BP updating rule appears far more frequently in
evolutionary models literature than the following two.
The death-birth process (DP) [10] was introduced by
Williams and Bjerknes [13,14] to study tumor growth and
has been independently studied in the context of particle
systems under the name “voter model” [1,2,15,16]. We note
that although this updating rule is called a model in the context
of particle systems, we will reserve the term “model” in this
article for a combination of updating rule, population structure,
and underlying game. By contrast with BP, in which fitness is
proportional to the stochastic birth rate of an individual, in
the death-birth process fitness rather governs an individual’s
chance of survival.
The link dynamics updating rule (LD) [17] arose from
the study of structured populations and focuses on pairwise
interactions. In most cases, a population structure is given
in terms of a (static) graph [18], in which nodes correspond
to individuals in the population. A link between two nodes
then indicates that in the updating step of the model, one of
these nodes can replace the other one. The effect of different
population structures on the evolutionary process has been
studied for several years [19–23]. This paper, on the other
hand, considers only unstructured, well-mixed populations.
A variant of LD was introduced by Szabo and To˝ke [24]
and has been studied under the names pairwise comparison
evolutionary process [25] and Fermi process [26] for the
prisoner’s dilemma on lattices.
1539-3755/2014/90(4)/042726(12) 042726-1 ©2014 American Physical Society
KAIPING, JACOBS, COX, AND SLUCKIN PHYSICAL REVIEW E 90, 042726 (2014)
Of particular interest in evolutionary models is the process
of fixation of a single mutant in a population of residents.
Relevant quantities obtained from a given model are the
fixation probability, i. e., the probability that a single mutant
allele overtakes a homogenous population of a different allele
and consequent fixation times.
In many evolutionary models, it is a reasonable assumption
that at any given point in time, only two different alleles are
present in the population. Given a sufficiently small mutation
rate μ, the probability that a mutant enters a population already
possessing more than one type of allele in it may be regarded
as negligible [27,28]. Thus the population will always only
contain residents and possibly at most one type of mutant.
If the population structure is homogenous, populations
where this assumption is true show equal fixation probabilities
for all three of the evolutionary processes introduced above, as
has been shown by Antal et al. [29]. In generic graphs, on the
other hand, this equivalence among BP, DP, and LD is lost [29].
This result entailed investigations into how different updating
rules lead to different evolutionary dynamics on various graph
structures [30,31].
In this article we investigate the differences between
the different updating rules mentioned above when instead
dismissing the two-allele assumption. The error induced by
that assumption has been previously studied by Wu et al. [26].
Their study employs the Fermi process as updating rule on a
well-mixed model of population size N . Of particular interest
is their result for coexistence games, in which the best reply
to every strategy is a different strategy. They find that the
two-allele approximation is reliable only if the mutation rate
μ behaves as O(N− 12 exp(−N )) (where N is the population
size). This is a very restrictive requirement, which is unlikely to
hold in practice even for small populations. The expected time
between mutations needs to be significantly longer than the age
of the universe in order for mutation to be a negligible factor.
For example, using Eqs. (3) and (4) below, we see that the
expected consensus and fixation times of the anticoordination
game with payoff matrix(
0 1
1 0
)
,
among 100 players, for any of the three updating rules, is
about 1.3 × 1030 time steps, which at a generation time as
low as 10 min corresponds to 1.8 × 1013 times the age of the
universe. In this paper we therefore drop the assumption that
mutation rates are so low that the fixation time is negligible
with respect to the time between mutations. Depending on the
circumstances, the implications of this relaxation may differ.
For some cases, it will be necessary to explicitly study high
mutation rates in a model. Alternatively, the effects of high
mutation can be studied by allowing more than two strategies
to be present at one time step in a given system.
The organization of this paper is as follows. In Sec. II,
we will recall some general observations from evolutionary
game theory before describing the update rules, BP, DP, and
LD in more detail, giving example calculations from basic
evolutionary game theory for each.
We will then present three models that show differences
in behavior for the three updating rules in Sec. III. Model 1
(III B) is a model from evolutionary linguistics, which we
use to examine the effect of different updating rules in the
context of high mutation rates. We will show that for high
mutation values, changing the updating rule affects not only
the quantitative values of the equilibria of a model but also the
topology of the equilibrium space.
For the other models, we look at cases where more than two
strategies are present in the system. Model 2 (III C) is a simple
model from abstract game theory. We show explicitly that the
equilibria of the model are identical for the three updating
rules. Interestingly, however, the choice of updating rule does
impact both the quantitative geometry of the equilibria and
their basins of attraction.
We continue using the example of the optional public goods
game with peer punishment (model 3, III D). We use this
example to illustrate that the choice of updating rule has a
significant quantitative influence also in well-known models
from the study of the evolution of cooperation.
Finally, in Sec. IV, we conclude with a general discussion
of the properties of the updating rules studied. We suggest
heuristic criteria as to when changing the updating rule
significantly alters the results of the model and in what contexts
to employ which updating rule.
II. UPDATING RULES
Updating rules such as BP, DP, or LD define a discrete
Markov process. The states correspond to all possible con-
figurations of the underlying graph. In the commonly treated
case of well-mixed populations, for example, every state is
completely described by giving the number of individuals
having a particular allele. The transition probabilities between
states are derived from the fitness values of the alleles,
according to the updating rule. The rules considered here are
defined such that the population size will be constant.
In order to provide context for our more general study,
we first recall well-known results for Markov processes in
well-mixed two-allele populations. In what follows we employ
the notation and conventions of Antal and Scheuring [32].
Consider a well-mixed population of players, each fol-
lowing one of two different strategies A and B. The state
of a population of size N is defined by a single integer
0  n  N , giving the number of individuals in the population
following strategy A. Suppose also that at each time step each
individual in the population plays a random other individual in
a symmetric game. Let the payoff for the row player be given
by the payoff matrix
A B
A a b
B c d
for a,b,c,d > 0.
The fitness of an individual playing strategy A or B,
respectively, is defined to be its expected payoff, that is,
fA(n)=a(n − 1) + b(N − n)
N − 1 , fB(n)=
cn + d(N − n − 1)
N − 1 .
The transition probabilities
λn = P (n → n + 1)
= P (one of type A procreates) P (one of type B dies)
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μn = P (n → n − 1)
= P (one of type B procreates) P (one of type A dies)
are derived from fA(n) and fB(n). An updating rule defines
how to obtain λn and μn from fA(n) and fB(n). We discuss
this in more detail below. Calculations for Moran’s BP are
given by Eqs. (5) and (6). The BP updating rule is one of
many consistent routes from fA(n),fB(n) to λn,μn. However,
whatever route is chosen, an invariant property of (λn,μn) is
that
fB(n)
fA(n)
= μn
λn
= P (n → n − 1)
P (n → n + 1)
= P (one of type B procreates)
P (one of type B dies)
×
[
P (one of type A procreates)
P (one of type A dies)
]−1
.
Thus μ/λ is the quotient of the stochastic growth rates of the
A and B populations, justifying the use of the term fitness in
this context, even when the updating rule is not BP.
For any two-allele Markov model with one individual dying
and one individual being born every step, define
qn =
n∏
j=1
μj
λj
q0 = 1 sn,m =
m∑
k=n
qk. (1)
We remark that qn and sn,m are polynomials in the variables
{xn = μnλn | n = 1 . . . N}, with no single μ or λ appearing in
the coefficients. Furthermore, define the probability n that the
system will be absorbed by state 0. In terms of sn,m this can be
expressed as
n = sn,N−1
s0,N−1
.
We recall that state 0 corresponds to a state in which all
individuals have allele A. The other absorbing state of each
individual playing B is denoted by N . The fixation probability
of a single mutant of strategy A in a population of N − 1
individuals following strategy B is then given by
ρAB = (1 − 1) = 1
s0,N−1
. (2)
The expected time until fixation of a single mutant, given that
the mutant will fixate, is the mean conditional exit time,
tfix =
N−1∑
n=1
s0,n−1sn,N−1
λnqns0,N−1
. (3)
In the models we explore below, there are three or more
possible strategies. A quantity of relevance in the three-allele
problem is the expected time tcons until a two-allele system
fixates in either of the two absorbing states. If the mutation
rate μ is of the order of magnitude of tcons−1 or higher,
the probability of of a mutation occuring in a nonfixated
system can no longer be considered negligible. The consensus
or unconditional mean exit time tcons is defined [33] as the
expected time until the system reaches either of the absorbing
states when starting at n = 1,
tcons =
N−1∑
n=1
sn,N−1
λnqns0,N−1
. (4)
By definition, μj
λj
has the same value for all three updating
rules. From Eqs. (1) and (2) it follows that in the general
case the fixation probabilities ρAB will be independent of
the specific updating rule chosen. By contrast, the additional
λn terms in Eqs. (3) and (4) can mean significant deviations
between the expected unconditional mean fixation times when
comparing the three updating rules.
In what follows we discuss some specific details of the BP,
DP, and LD processes.
A. Birth-death process
The Moran process, introduced by P. A. P. Moran in 1958
[9], is frequently used as an updating rule in evolutionary
simulations. It is also known as the BP or biased birth-death
process. In every time step, one random individual is replaced
by a copy of an individual randomly chosen with probability
proportional to its fitness. An individual can be replaced by a
copy of itself.
The transition probabilities in the two-allele case are
therefore given by
P (n → n − 1) = μn = (N − n)fB(n)
nfA(n) + (N − n)fB(n)
n
N
, (5)
P (n → n + 1) = λn = nfA(n)
nfA(n) + (N − n)fB(n)
N − n
N
,
P (n → n) = 1 − μn − λn, (6)
P (n → j ) = 0 otherwise,
so we have μn
λn
= fB (n)
fA(n) and therefore
ρAB = 1∑N−1
k=0
∏k
l=1
fB (l)
fA(l)
,
= 1∑N−1
k=0
∏k
l=1
cl+d(N−l−1)
a(l−1)+b(N−l)
.
For the neutral case a = b = c = d this gives us a fixation
probability ρAB = 1N . For the case of a mutant with a constant
fitness advantage a = b = r > 1 = c = d we obtain the well-
known result [9] that the fixation probability is given by ρAB =
1∑N−1
k=0 r−k
= 1−r−11−r−N .
By way of example, we can calculate the expected times
until fixation for the prisoner’s dilemma with payoff matrix
Q =
(
1 5
0.1 3
)
(7)
for a population size of 100. From Eq. (3) we obtain that
the conditional fixation time tfix ≈ 1264.5 for both a single
cooperator among defectors and a single defector among
cooperators. Following Eq. (4), the average time until the
system is in any fixated state again after starting from a
single defector is introduced into a population of cooperators
is approximately 569.6 updating steps, while for a single
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cooperator among a population of defectors is close to the
life expectancy of that cooperator, because the probability of
him or her reproducing is near 0. Therefore in this case we
have tcons ≈ 105.3.
B. Death-birth process
In the ecological and evolutionary literature, fitness usually
corresponds to the mean number of adult offspring per
generation. High fitness can thus imply a high fecundity, as
seen in the BP. Alternatively, high fitness can be expressed
as high probability of survival. This is modelled by the DP
updating rule. Just as in BP, in every time step an individual
chosen randomly according so some distribution is replaced by
a copy of a random individual. However, in DP, the fecundities
or birth probabilities of all individuals are assumed to be equal,
while the death probabilities are taken to be proportional to the
reciprocal of the fitness.
The transition probabilities for this updating rule are thus
given by
P (n → n − 1) = μn = N − n
N
n/fA(n)
n/fA(n) + (N − n)/fB (n)
= N − n
N
nfB(n)
nfB(n) + (N − n)fA(n) ,
P (n → n + 1) = λn = n
N
(N − n)fA(n)
nfB(n) + (N − n)fA(n) ,
P (n → n) = 1 − μn − λn,
P (n → j ) = 0 otherwise. (8)
Note that μn
λn
= fB (n)
fA(n) , just as for the birth-death process, and
therefore the fixation probability for the DP is indeed the same
as for the BP [29].
This is not, however, true for the fixation times in the
prisoner’s dilemma example with payoff matrixQ as in Eq. (7).
Here we have a slightly lower conditional fixation time of
tfix ≈ 1191.0 for both cases. The expected time until the system
is in any fixated state, after starting from a single defector, is
slightly longer than in the BP, with a value of 575.3 time steps.
Although a single cooperator in a population of defectors has
a relatively large probability of reproduction compared to the
BP, at 1100 , the likelihood of dying is very high. As a result, the
expected time to elimination is tcons = 11.4, significantly less
than in the BP case.
C. Link dynamics
The third frequently applied updating rule that we study,
LD, proceeds as follows. At every time step a random link of
the graph describing the population structure is chosen. Two
individuals are adjacent to the edge. One of these is chosen
randomly as donor k with probability proportional to its fitness.
The other individual j is then replaced by a copy of k.
In many cases of numerical simulation, the link dynamics
updating rule has a significant computational benefit over BP
and DP. The LD rule requires the calculation of the fitness
values for only two individuals in every time step. BP and DP,
by contrast, necessarily rely on knowing the fitness values of
every individual in the population.
For the well-mixed case, the population structure contains
an edge from every individual to every individual, including
itself. The population structure is thus given by a fully
connected graph with self-loops. This is consistent with the
assumption made in the previous two subsections for BP and
DP, namely that in the same time step an individual can both
procreate and die, thereby replacing itself.
The probability that a self-loop is randomly selected as
focal link is NN(N−1)
2 +N
= 2
N+1 . In the absence of mutation, this
implies that nothing happens for such a time step. A model with
self-loops corresponds to a model without self-loops in which
there is a probability of 2
N+1 for every time step that nothing
happens in that step. We can thus transform one approach to
the other with a linear rescaling of time by a factor N−1
N+1 , such
that results given for one approach are easily translated to the
alternative.
A related well-known updating rule for well-mixed popu-
lations is the Fermi process [33]. In the same way as in the
LD updating rule, a random link in the population is chosen.
However, in case of the Fermi process, both individuals are
equally likely to be chosen as donor k. In contrast with LD,
where j is always replaced by a copy of k, for the Fermi
process this replacement happens only with a probability of
1
1+exp(β[πj−πk ]) .
This probability distribution is known as the Fermi distri-
bution and is eponymous for the updating rule. Here β > 0 is
a constant describing the strength of selection. In the context
of the Fermi distribution, it can be interpreted as an inverse
temperature. Lower β corresponds to higher randomness of
the system and thus weaker selection.
The quantities πx are payoff functions [26]. In contrast to
the fitness functions fx employed in the other updating rules
considered here, these payoff functions may take negative
values. We also note that, while for BP, DP, and LD every
time step corresponds to precisely one individual procreating
and one individual dying, in the Fermi process there is a
probability of 1 − 11+exp(β[πj−πk]) in every time step that no
individual procreates and none die.
In fact, we see that the Fermi process is a variant of LD if
we define a fitness function fx = exp(βπx). In the LD case,
the transition probabilities are
P (n → n − 1) = μn = 2 n
N
N − n
N
fB(n)
fA(n) + fB(n) ,
P (n → n + 1) = λn = 2N − n
N
n
N
fA(n)
fA(n) + fB(n) ,
P (n → n) = 1 − μn − λn,
P (n → j ) = 0 otherwise. (9)
For the Fermi process, we have
PF (n → n − 1) = μFn =
n
N
N − n
N
fB(n)
fA(n) + fB(n) =
1
2
μn,
P F (n → n + 1) = λFn =
N − n
N
n
N
fA(n)
fA(n) + fB(n) =
1
2
λn,
P F (n → n) = 1 − μFn − λFn =
1
2
(1 − μn − λn) + 12 ,
P F (n → j ) = 0 otherwise. (10)
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Comparing Eqs. (10) and (11) indicates a probability of 12 in
each time step that the Fermi process behaves like LD and a
probability of 12 that it remains in the same state as before. As
a result, one can translate times and expected times obtained
through LD to the Fermi process by rescaling, stochastically
or exactly respectively, by a factor of 2.
From the terms for μn and λn in Eqs. (10) and (11) we see
that, as for BP and DP, we have μn
λn
= fB (n)
fA(n) . Hence the same
fixation probabilities for LD and Fermi process are the same
as for those two updating rules.
When comparing the transition probabilities of the three
updating rules, recalling Eqs. (5), (9), and (10), we see that
μBPn =
n
N
(N − n)fB(n)
nfA(n) + (N − n)fB(n) ,
μDPn =
N − n
N
nfB (n)
nfB (n) + (N − n)fA(n) ,
μLDn = 2
n
N
N − n
N
fB(n)
fA(n) + fB(n) ,
= 21
μBPn
+ 1
μDPn
. (11)
Thus μLDn is the harmonic mean of the analogous quantities
μBPn and μDPn . The transition probability λLDn is likewise the
harmonic mean of the corresponding quantities for BP and
DP. The LD updating rule is therefore expected to lead to
behavior that is intermediate between these two rules.
By way of example we see that for the fixation times in the
prisoners’ dilemma with payoff matrix Q from Eq. (7), we get
precisely the arithmetic mean of the corresponding values from
the birth-death process and death-birth process. We obtain
tfix ≈ 1227.7 for both a single cooperator among defectors and
a single defector among cooperators. The expected time until
the system is in any fixated state, after starting from a single
defector, is 572.5 time steps, and for starting from a single
cooperator in a population of defectors we have tcons ≈ 58.4.
Due to the exponential function deriving fitness from
payoff, and the additional parameter β, a direct comparison
between the Fermi process and the BP, DP, and LD updating
rule is outside the scope of this paper. For a detailed analysis
of the fixation times for the Fermi process for β  1 we refer
to Altrock and Traulsen [33]. In this reference the authors also
give a comparison between the birth-death process generalized
to contain a selection strength parameter and the Fermi process
for low selection strength.
It is the equality of the fixation probabilities of BP, DP,
and LD which motivates Antal et al. [29] to refer to these
three updating rules as equivalent for homogenous graphs. We
remark that this is a very strong term for this specific property.
We have indeed seen that for the simple cases of well-mixed
mutation-free two-strategy games considered in this section
the long-term behavior of the model, as expressed by the
fixation probability, does not change under different updating
rules. The vast difference in the consensus times, however,
serves as a first indication that applying different updating
rules may influence model results. In the next section we will
show that different updating rules can indeed lead to different
long-term behavior of otherwise equal evolutionary models.
III. EXAMPLE MODELS
We will now present three examples of systems in which
a change to the updating rule also significantly changes its
dynamics. Just as for the results given in the previous section,
all three examples feature well-mixed populations of discrete
strategies. For each of the three examples, we will first describe
the model in general before giving the results for each of BP,
DP, and LD and comparing the results. However, in contrast
with the previous section, the examples studied here will not
assume that the mutation rate is small enough to be negligible
for the dynamics of a nonfixated system. Furthermore, fitness
functions will not be restricted to the expected payoff from
two-player games but can be arbitrary nonzero functions.
A. Methodology
Mean-field theories are mathematically simplified methods
for analyzing stochastic well-mixed systems. Using this
approach, the Markov chains of an evolutionary model with
a large population can be approximated by systems of
ordinary differential equations. We will use both the mean-field
approximation as well as stochastic methods to examine the
example models below.
On the one hand, the large-population approximation of the
mean-field theory has the effect of smoothing the stochastic
effects in a system, which are of particular interest when
studying frequent mutation. On the other hand, the mean-field
theory is often more computationally efficient than numerical
simulations or the calculation of a Markov chain stationary
distribution.
Furthermore, the system of ordinary differential equations
allows us to study the equilibria of the mean-field theory of an
evolutionary system. Equilibria are characterized by the fact
that the differentials of the unknown functions are zero for
those states. Depending on their stability, these equilibria can
be repellers, saddle points, or attractors. If a state is an attractor,
a small disturbance will lead to the system returning to that
same state. Attractors of the system are therefore evolutionarily
stable states. Saddles and repellers lie on the boundaries
between the basins of attraction of different evolutionarily
stable states. Thus, mean-field theory is useful for cataloguing
all evolutionarily stable states, together with their basins of
attraction.
To obtain the system of analytical ordinary differential
equations corresponding to each updating rule, we gener-
alize the method described by Traulsen et al. [34] to the
higher-dimensional case. Let P τ (ξ ) = P τ (ξ1,ξ2, . . . ,ξn) be
the probability that a process with n alleles is in state ξ at
time τ . Let F i(ξ ) be the fecundity, i. e., the probability that
an individual of type i is born when the system is in state ξ ,
and Mi(ξ ) the mortality rate of type i. Define ei to be the ith
unit vector (0, . . . ,0,1,0, . . . ,0). Then the stochastic process
is given by the master equation
P τ+1(ξ ) − P τ (ξ ) =
n∑
j=1
n∑
i=1;i =j
[P τ (ξ − ei + ej )
×F i(ξ − ei + ej )Mj (ξ − ei + ej )
−P τ (ξ )F i(ξ )Mj (ξ )].
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Let N =∑ni=1 ξi be the population size. Introducing x =
ξ/N , t = τ/N , and ρ(x,t) = NPNt (Nx), ρ is given by a
Taylor series in x and t . Ignoring higher-order terms in N−1,
this series yields the partial differential equation
d
dt
ρ(x,t) = − d
dx
[a(x)ρ(x,t)] + 1
2
d2
dx2
[b2(x)ρ(x,t)]
with a(x) = F (x) − M(x) and b(x) =
√
N−1[F (x) + M(x)].
For N → ∞ the diffusion term b → 0, and we get a system
of ordinary differential equations,
x˙ = F (x) − M(x).
This means that in the infinite population limit, the change x˙i
of the relative frequency of allele i is given by the difference
of its probabilistic fecundity Fi(x) and its probabilistic
mortality Mi(x).
Model equilibria therefore correspond to states in which
M(x) = F (x). In systems without mutation this is equivalent
to the condition that the fitnesses of all strategies present be
equal. This condition is independent of the updating rule. In
the presence of mutation it might by analogy be reasonable to
assume that a change of updating rule might do no more than
perturb the precise value of an equilibrium, while leaving the
topology of the equilibrium structure intact. This is, however,
not the case, as the first example (III B) will show.
By contrast, for stochastic systems with finite populations
the notion of equilibrium is less clear. If the mutation
probability of the model is greater than zero, the underlying
Markov chain is irreducible. Thus the chain has a unique
stationary probability distribution π [35]. As a real-valued
function on a discrete space, this distribution has local maxima,
minima, and saddle points. These special points, however, do
not correspond to equilibria of the mean-field theory, and
the notion of a basin of attraction is hardly applicable. In
particular, the stationary distribution does not contain any
information on basins of attraction, because, heuristically,
basins of attraction correspond to short-term behavior, while
the stationary distribution is by definition concerned with only
the long-term limit. When analyzing our model 3 III D in terms
of its long-term behavior, we will therefore resort to summary
statistics.
B. Model 1: Evolutionary linguistics
In our first example, we examine a model from evolutionary
linguistics. The model was constructed by Komarova, Niyogi,
and Nowak [3] to study the circumstances under which a single
dominant language can evolve, given the fact that language
learning is error prone. Komarova et al. only employ the birth
process, but the model is easily modified to use DP or LD
instead.
We will use this model to show that the different updating
rules can lead to different topologies of the phase spaces of
some models with high mutation rates.
Consider a finite population of agents. Each agent speaks
exactly one of n different languages. Define the fitness fi of
an individual speaking language i as
fi = f0 + 12
n∑
j=1
aij xj . (12)
Here f0 > 0 is the background fitness which does not depend
on the agent’s language, xj is the proportion of the population
speaking language j , and A = aij is a fully symmetric mutual
comprehension matrix, i. e.,
aii = 1 aij = a (i = j ), (13)
with a constant parameter a. In every time step, one individual
is replaced by another individual according to the updating rule
chosen. Mutation is uniform with probability μ > 0, such that
the offspring has a probability of qii = q = 1 − μ of speaking
the same language as their parent, and a probability of qij =
μ
n−1 for each of the other languages.
1. Birth process
The BP is the original updating rule used in Ref. [3].
In BP, the probability of an individual of type j dying
is Mj (x) = xj . The birth probability, including mutation,
is F j (x) = φ−1∑i fixiqij , where φ =∑nm=1 fmxm. Thus
the BP with mutation corresponds to the replicator-mutator
differential equation [36] used by Komarova et al. [3]
x˙j =
∑
i
fixiqij − φxj (14)
under a dynamic rescaling of time which does not change the
equilibria of the model.
Komarova et al. have proved that for all values of the model
parameters a, μ, n, f0, there is an equilibrium in which every
language has the same frequency xj = 1n . Stable asymmetric
equilibria with one dominant language exist if and only if the
discriminant
D = DBP = 4[−1 − a(n − 2) − f0(n − 1)](1 − q)(n − 1)
× (1 − a) + (1 − a)2[1 + (n − 2)q]2 (15)
is positive. For D > 0 then also an asymmetric third type
of equilibrium exists such that one language i has frequency
xi = xeq(a,μ,n,f0) < 12 and all other languages have identical
frequency 1−xi
n−1 . If xi <
1
n
, this asymmetric equilibrium is
stable and the symmetric equilibrium is unstable. Otherwise,
the symmetric equilibrium is an attractor and the asymmetric
equilibrium is a repeller. The equilibrium structures in this
model, as a function of the mutation rate μ, are shown in
Fig. 1. [3]
We will now generalize the model in order to derive its
behavior under the DP and LD updating rules.
2. Death process
For the DP, we have F j (x) =∑i xiqij and Mj (x) =
ψ−1 1
fj
xj . Here ψ =
∑n
m=1
xm
fm
is again a normalizing factor.
Thus the system of analytical ordinary differential equations
corresponding to (14) is given by
x˙j =
∑
i
xiqij − ψ−1 1
fj
xj . (16)
We apply the computations from Ref. [3] to this modified
model. An equilibrium is given by x˙j = 0. Using Eqs. (12),
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FIG. 1. Equilibria of model 1 with BP as updating rule for varying μ and a = 0.2,f0 = 0.1. The points on the solid line are stable equilibria
for those parameter values, the points on the dotted line are unstable equilibria. (a) For n = 2; (b) for n = 10.
(13), and (16), this becomes
1
(1 − a)xj + a + f0 xj =
n∑
m=1
xm
(1 − a)xm + a + f0
∑
i
xiqij .
Without loss of generality, let x1 = x and xi = 1−xn−1 for i = 1.
Then
1
(1 − a)x + a + f0 x =
n∑
m=2
1 − x
(n − 1)(a + f0) + (1 − x)(1 − a)
×
(
n∑
i=2
1 − x
n − 1
1 − q
n − 1 + xq
)
,
which has the solutions x = 1
n
and
x = ±
√
DDP + (1 − a)(nq − 1)
2(1 − a)(nq − 1)
DDP = −(a − 1)(nq − 1)(3anq + 4f0nq − 4an − 4aq
− 4f0n − 4f0q + nq + 5a + 4f0 − 1).
We have thus obtained a similar condition as in the BP case,
stating that asymmetric equilibria with one focal language of
frequency x and all other languages having frequency 1−x
n−1
exist if and only if the discriminant
DDP = DBP + 4(q − 1)2(n − 1)(1 − a)
× [(a + f0)n + (1 − a)] > 0. (17)
3. Link dynamics
In the case of the LD update rule, the limit of the stochastic
process for increasing population size is given by the ordinary
differential equation
x˙j =
∑
i
(∑
k
fi
fi + fk xk
)
xiqij −
(∑
k
fk
fj + fk xk
)
xj
because Mj (x) = (∑k fkfj+fk xk)xj and F j (x) =∑
i(
∑
k
fi
fi+fk xk)xiqij for LD.
Using the same argumentation as before, it follows from
this differential equation that the equilibria are given by
0 =
∑
k
(∑
i
fi
fi + fk xiqi1
)
xk −
(∑
k
fk
f1 + fk x
)
xk.
Using Eqs. (12), (13), and (16), this is a cubic equation in x,
0 = 1 − q
2
[
x2 − (1 − x)
2
n − 1
]
+ x(1 − x)
{
q[(1 − a)x + a + f0] + 2 − n − q
n − 1
×
[
(1 − a)1 − x
n − 1 + a + f0
]}
with solutions x = 1
n
and
x = (1 − a)(n − 1)q ±
√
DLD
(1 − a)(nq + n − 2)
DLD = DBP + (q − 1)2(n − 1)(1 − a)
× [2(a + f0)n + 3(1 − a)] (18)
if DLD > 0.
4. Comparison
Comparing DDP [Eq. (17)] with DBP [Eq. (15)], we see that
due to the positive difference
DDP − DBP = 4(q − 1)2(n − 1)(1 − a)
× [(a + f0)n + (1 − a)] > 0
the asymmetric equilibria exist for a broader range of parame-
ters in the case of DP than in the case of the BP. In particular,
the death process permits a stable asymmetric equilibrium with
a dominant language for parameter values that only support a
symmetric equilibrium in case of BP.
We see that the discriminant DLD [Eq. (18)] still has an
additional positive addend as compared to the birth-death
process discriminant DBP. On the other hand, we have DLD <
DDP if q < 1. Thus, just as derived in Eq. (12) for the case of
two strategies in the absence of mutation, we see that the link
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FIG. 2. (Color online) Equilibria of model 1 for varying μ for a = 0.2,f0 = 0.1. The points on the solid line are stable equilibria for those
parameter values, and the points on the dotted line are unstable equilibria. (a) For n = 2; (b) for n = 10.
dynamics process is a an intermediate updating rule between
DP and BP.
In the case of n = 2 and μ > 0, DDP > DLD > DBP still
holds. Thus for a range of parameters, the equilibrium structure
under DP differs from the equilibrium structure under BP even
for a model with only two languages.
5. Interpretation
We conclude that, as shown in Fig. 2, for low mutation
rates the behavior of the model under all three updating
rules is similar. All updating rules lead to stable asymmetric
equilibria at similar values. For larger mutation rates, the
quantitative difference between the equilibria under different
updating rules increases. When the mutation rate reaches a
critical threshold, at (1−a)(n−1)
n(a(n−2)+f0n+2)  μ <
(1−a)(n−1)
n(a(n−1)+f0n+1) , the
behavior of the model changes qualitatively when changing
the updating rule. In this case, both LD and DP permit
the existence of asymmetric equilibria, while the BP shows
only the stable symmetric equilibrium. For (1−a)(n−1)
n(a(n−1)+f0n+1) 
μ < 2(1−a)(n−1)
n(a(2n−3)+2f0n+3) , the model shows a different qualitative
behavior change. For a large area of the parameter space,
both BP and LD do not permit the existence of asymmetric
equilibria, but the DP still sustains a stable asymmetric
equilibrium, in which the dominant language has a frequency
of substantially more than half the population. Only for μ 
2(1−a)(n−1)
n(a(2n−3)+2f0n+3) do all three models show the same behavior
again, with only a stable symmetric equilibrium present.
The conclusion from these calculations is that changing the
updating rule does not merely perturb the equilibria but also
that it can also give rise to different equilibrium structures.
Thus we have illustrated that for high mutation rates the
number and structure of evolutionary stable states in a model
can depend on the choice of updating rule.
C. Model 2: Abstract evolutionary game theory
For sufficiently low mutation rates, we have seen that
the equilibria of the previous example change only very
slightly under different updating rules. The locations and types
(attractor, repeller, or saddle) of the equilibria in the absence
of mutation are dependent only on the fitness functions of
the alleles. It might therefore be a reasonable hypothesis that
knowledge of the locations of saddle points and stable and
unstable equilibria in the fitness landscape is sufficient to fix
the topology of the basins of attraction in this landscape. This
is, however, not the case.
We now introduce a different model from the field of
abstract evolutionary game theory. We will use it to illustrate
that the topology of the basins of attraction of the stable
equilibria can change when choosing a different updating rule.
Consider a well-mixed population of size n. Each individual
in the population has one of the alleles A, B, or C. The fitness of
an individual of type A, B, and C, respectively, are frequency
dependent and given by
fA = exp
(
3 − 3nA + 9nB2
)
,
fB = exp
(
7 + 66nB − 81nAnB − 64n2B
)
, (19)
fC = exp
(
3nA − 9nB2
)
,
where 0  nA,nB  1 are the relative frequencies of alleles A
and B, respectively.
We can study the system in the limit for n → ∞, as
described in Sec. III A. We thereby obtain ordinary differential
equations for the behavior of the system. Numerically solving
these ODEs yields the basins of attraction shown in Fig. 4.
Running numerical simulations for this model with n = 50,
starting 500 runs at every location of the simplex and averaging
their states when fixated, we obtain the results shown in Fig. 3.
1. Comparison
The attractors (filled circles) and repellers (end point of the
black trajectory) remain the same under different updating
rules. However, while mutation and random drift do not
feature in the large mutation limit, the updating rule still has a
significant influence on the basins of attraction in the model.
For BP, the majority of states, including the area near the
stable mixed equilibrium M between A and C (purple), lie in
the basin of attraction of the pure B equilibrium (red). This is
apparent both in the numerical and large-population versions
of the model. In contrast, given a DP updating rule, the majority
of states, including the area around M, lie in the basin of
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FIG. 3. (Color online) Numerical simulation results of model 2 in barycentric coordinates. In each subfigure, the colors indicate how many
runs starting in that location fixate in what state. In all three cases, the only runs fixating in C (red, bottom left) are those already starting in a
fixated C state. All mixtures of of A and C (bottom line) fixate in A (green, bottom right). The rest of the state space is split between states that
nearly exclusively fixate in pure B [blue (dark gray)] and states that fixate in either A or B [cyan (bright gray)], with darker colors indicating a
higher probability to fix in B. (a) BP; (b) DP; (c) LD.
attraction of the stable mixed equilibrium between A and B
(green). We also see that for LD, the area near M lies in the
basin of attraction of B but close to the boundary between the
basins of attraction.
Therefore, we expect that small mutations away from the
mixed stable A and C state will lead to fixation in B for
the birth process, and to the stable equilibrium between A
and B for DP. In the case of LD, the long-term behavior
of the system depends significantly on the stochastic motion of
the system. These behaviours are indeed seen in the results of
the numerical simulations, Fig. 3.
Heuristically, we see that in the BP, trajectories point
towards strong attractors, which is most obivous in this
example when considering the pure B equilibrium. The DP,
on the other hand, is dominated by the repellers, which can
be seen from the fact that all trajectories point away from the
unstable pure C equilibrium. Even close to the strong attractor
B, the leftmost trajectory follows a nearly straight line away
from C. The LD updating rule shows both, with the precise
behavior locally depending on the strength of attraction or
repulsion. With only two strategies in a system, the geometry is
one dimensional, and therefore there is no difference between
a focus on attractors or repellers, so this effect can only be
seen for three or more strategies.
In order to obtain geometrically different basins of at-
traction such as those described in this example, the system
has to contain at least two attractors. Close to an unstable
equilibrium between these two attractors, the fitnesses of
the alleles must be of different orders of magnitude. In
the geometric interpretation, there is a large angle between
vectors describing the trajectory away from a strong repeller
and that toward a strong attractor. In the example given
above, the relevant unstable mixed equilibrium is nA ≈ 0.176,
nB ≈ 0.824, nC = 0. Away from this in the direction of C,
fA decreases, but fB increases significantly, while fC is very
low. Thus the boundary of the basin of attraction has a different
orientation close to that point and can differ significantly when
followed further.
However, different updating rules can still lead to different
behavior in a system not containing equilibria of these types,
as the following example will illustrate.
D. Model 3: Public goods game with punishment
The previous example shows that the impact of the choice
of updating rule can be quite large even for stochastic
simulations. The shape of the basins of attraction is however
strongly dependent on the precise coefficients, and the different
FIG. 4. (Color online) Areas of convergence for BP, DP, and LD in Model 2 in barycentric coordinates. The thick black line denotes the
boundary between the basins of attraction. Other lines indicate trajectories through the population state space ending in the mixed A and C
(yellow, bottom line of the triangle), pure B (red, all trajectories left of the boundary line), and mixed A and B (green, all trajectories right of
the boundary line) equilibria.
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FIG. 5. (Color online) Areas of convergence for BP, DP, and LD in Model 3 in barycentric coordinates for r = 2.8, c = 0.8, β = 1.5, and
γ = 0.6. The thick black line denotes the boundary between the basins of attraction. Other lines indicate trajectories through the population
state space ending up in the pure D equilibrium (yellow, all trajectories left of the boundary line) and on the neutral line between C and P (all
trajectories right of the boundary line). Note the trajectory starting near the even mixture of D and P ends up in the pure D equilibrium in the
BP, while it ends up on the neutral line for the other updating rules.
behavior occurs largely due to strong selection caused by the
exponential function in Eq. (19).
The public goods game is an N -player game frequently
used in theoretical [37] and experimental economics [38,39]
to model the tragedy of the commons. The game is a natural
extension of the weak prisoner’s dilemma to an arbitrary
number of players.
In one PGG round, players can choose to invest in a common
good or not. Contributing cooperators (C) pay a fixed cost c.
All contributions are added up, multiplied by a factor r > 1,
and distributed among all participants, no matter if they were
contributing cooperators or noncontributing defectors (D). For
investigations into the evolution of cooperation, this simple
model is often extended by two additional strategies [40].
Peer punishers (P) choose to punish defectors as well as
contribute to the public goods. After resources have been
redistributed, they pay a high cost γ per defector present in the
game. By doing so, they inflict an even higher utility loss, the
fine β, on each defector present in the game. [41,42]
Many workers in population dynamics literature add loners
(L) as additional strategy. Players who follow this strategy
gain a small frequency-independent payoff λ. Loners opt out
of the game altogether, reflecting the fact that participating in
a specific group is also a choice which can be studied using
game theoretical methods [43,44].
Further extensions to the basic public goods game have
been studied in the literature, such as pool punishers who pay
a constant fee for the punishment of all defectors [42,45] or
strategies that reward cooperators in addition to or alternatively
to punishing defectors [37,46].
If a strategy would have a negative payoff in a given state,
we will assume a fitness of 0. Otherwise, the fitness is taken
to be proportional to the payoff. The fitnesses for the four
strategies are then given by
fC = max
(
0,rc
nC + nP
nC + nD + nP − c
)
,
fD = max
(
0,rc
nC + nP
nC + nD + nP − nPβ
)
,
fP = max
(
0,rc
nC + nP
nC + nD + nP − c − nDγ
)
, fL = λ.
Figure 5 shows the behavior of the mean-field theory for this
model in the D-C-P plane. The parameter values are r = 2.8,
c = 0.8, β = 1.5, and γ = 0.6. The state where all individuals
follow the D strategy is an attractor. In the absence of defectors,
cooperators and punishers are indistinguishable. Every state
not in the basin of attraction of the pure D state will converge
towards a mixed C and P state. However, the fitness functions
close to the unstable equilibrium on the D-P line are fC > 0,
fD = 0, and fP = 0. It is therefore not surprising that the
geometry of the basin of attraction changes only slightly when
changing the updating rule.
Changing the update rule used for the public goods game
will therefore have an influence on the long-term behavior of
the system only when stochasticity plays a significant role. We
will now investigate the effect of different updating rules on
the stationary distribution of the Markov chain.
Figure 6 shows the stationary distribution of the Markov
chain induced by the public goods game with punishment and
different updating rules. The values have been numerically
obtained through power iteration of the transition probability
matrix P. Darker color indicates a higher probability of the
corresponding state in the stationary distribution. The locations
of the global minima of probability according to BP and DP
differ significantly. The stationary distribution obtained from
LD shows two local minima roughly corresponding to the
global minima of BP and DP, again supporting the hypothesis
that LD generally behaves as a mixture of BP and DP. We
numerically calculated the average frequencies for D, C, and
P in the stationary distribution. For the BP, we obtain a
defector-dominated population with nD = 0.748. The average
relative frequencies for the cooperative strategies amount to
nC = 0.0899 and nP = 0.0899. In contrast to the BP, where
nearly three-quarters of the population are defectors, less than
half of the population follow a noncooperative strategy in
the DP, with nD = 0.428. The cooperative strategies amount
to nP = 0.406, nC = 0.166. The LD updating rule is again
intermediate between BP and DP, yielding nP = 0.314, nC =
0.145, and nD = 0.541. This means that the change of updating
rule alone can change an evolutionary model from being
dominated by defectors to including primarily cooperative
strategies.
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FIG. 6. Stationary distribution of the Markov chain induced by the public goods game with punishment for N = 40, μ = 0.003953,
r = 2.8, c = 0.8, β = 1.5, and γ = 0.6 and different updating rules. Darker color indicates a higher probability of the corresponding state in
the stationary distribution. (a) BP; (b) DP; (c) LD.
IV. DISCUSSION
In this paper, we have studied the impact of the choice of
updating rule, that part of a model which describes the manner
in which a population changes from generation to generation,
on the results of well-mixed evolutionary models. Our work
complements known results for structured populations, which
are able to more closely represent many real-world systems.
It has previously been established in the literature that in
populations with nonhomogenous graph structures, where
nodes have different numbers of links leading to them,
changing the updating rule can change the dynamics of an
evolutionary model [29,30].
Regular graph structures, in particular square or cubic
lattices (spatial games, e. g., Cox and Griffeath in Ref. [1]) or
“well-mixed” populations (e. g., Komarova et al. in Ref. [3])
have been widely used for models in evolutionary game theory.
Both lattices and well-mixed populations are homogenous
graphs. Social networks, however, cannot be represented by
regular graphs. Rather, they have a degree distribution with a
heavy tail, where many nodes have low degrees, but very few
nodes have a very high degree each. In the field of evolutionary
game theory inhomogenous graphs have been successfully
used to study the evolution of cooperation [4,17,47–50], but
the impact of changing the updating rule on these results is not
fully clear.
Here we have turned our attention back to the most fun-
damental case of well-mixed populations. We have explored
three example models in which the choice of updating rule has
a severe impact on the system’s behavior, even in the absence
of a structured population. They highlight three additional
constraints on results suggesting updating rule equivalence.
We have found that for high mutation rates, different updating
rules can lead to the presence of nontrivially different equilibria
in the system. Even in the absence of mutation, we find that
when a system has multiple stable equilibria, their basins of
attraction can topologically differ under different updating
rules. Differing behavior can be seen in the mean-field
approximation as well as in the stochastic theory. We have
further shown that the choice of updating rule can significantly
influence relative frequencies of the strategies in the long run
if more than two strategies interact nontrivially.
We are therefore led to conclude that the equivalence
of updating rules should not be assumed in general. Any
generalization away from investigating fixation probabilities of
two-strategy games on homogenous graphs with low mutation
may lead to model results that depend on the updating
rule.
The properties of evolutionary models with different up-
dating rules outlined in this article have a concrete impact
on modeling real-world evolutionary processes. It falls to
researchers to choose the updating rule based on qualities of
the system to be explored. For example, one interpretation sees
the three rules as representing different population dynamics.
If we consider the death of a random individual, uniformly
chosen, to be a normalization term to keep the population
size constant, it is obvious that the dynamics obtained from a
BP model approximate a growing population. By the same
argument, the DP updating rule, on the other hand, can
be considered a renormalized approximation to a shrinking
population and may be significantly better suited for systems
where detrimental mutations go extinct quickly. The link
dynamics updating rule generally behaves like a mean between
the BP and DP and appears particular suited for models where
direct competition between individuals plays a significant role
for the dynamics of the system.
It is well known that selection in growing and shrinking
populations are connected to different selection mechanisms
[51,52]. When modeling concrete evolutionary processes, it
is therefore important to choose the updating rule based on
the population dynamics and selection mechanisms of the
reference system.
The study of updating rules in the context of evolutionary
game theory is thus important in order to build more realistic
models of the systems studied. Far more is known about
selection on birth both in models and in reality. Birth processes
are more widespread in modeling, and birth and progeny are
easier to study than natural deaths. This applies even more so
to cultural variants. Circumstances of their emergence are far
more easily observed than those of their demise. Furthermore,
in the ecological context of life-history theory it is clear that
relative birth rate and survival probability may be determined
by different factors, and models accurately representing this
phenomenon may be preferred. Incorporating selection terms
on birth and death may lead to coexistence of organisms
selected for birth and those selected for survival [53,54].
Understanding the evolutionary dynamics of such systems
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requires a profound understanding of the impact of selection
on birth versus selection of death.
In this article, we have studied only well-mixed populations.
However, because it is known that population structure by
itself can heavily modify model behavior, and because many
real-world systems show significantly nontrivial population
structures, future work needs to study the dynamics of
structured populations with different updating rules. Models
also show the impact of more than two alleles and high
mutation rates on structured population models.
In conclusion, our work has highlighted the dangers
of blindly following traditional algorithms when designing
evolutionary models. Any model should be constructed to best
represent the system it explores. In cases where a statement on
the updating rule is not implied by a problem it is important to
confirm that the updating rule does not have a meaningful
impact on the model, while recalling that results for the
stochastic and deterministic cases can differ. We refer back
to our introduction, in which we noted that not only our
understanding of the world but also policies affecting our
interactions with it are sometimes informed by evolutionary
models. It would be unfortunate to find ourselves misled by
unexpected quirks of model behavior.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
We thank the EPSRC for Ph.D. funding.
[1] J. T. Cox and D. Griffeath, Ann. Probab. 14, 347 (1986).
[2] D. L. Schwartz, Ann. Probab. 5, 522 (1977).
[3] N. L. Komarova, P. Niyogi, and M. A. Nowak, J. Theor. Biol.
209, 43 (2001).
[4] H. Ohtsuki, C. Hauert, E. Lieberman, and M. A. Nowak, Nature
441, 502 (2006).
[5] J. C. van den Bergh, J. Evol. Econ. 17, 521 (2007).
[6] D. M. Frank and S. Sarkar, PLoS ONE 5, e10688 (2010).
[7] A. Szolnoki and M. Perc, Sci. Rep. 4 (2014).
[8] A. Szolnoki and M. Perc, Phys. Rev. E 89, 022804
(2014).
[9] P. A. P. Moran, Math. Proc. Cambridge 54, 60 (1958).
[10] C. Hauert, J. Theor. Biol. 240, 627 (2006).
[11] P. Clifford and A. Sudbury, Biometrika 60, 581 (1973).
[12] S. Wright, Genetics 16, 97 (1931).
[13] T. Williams and R. Bjerknes, Adv. Appl. Probab. 3, 210
(1971).
[14] M. Bramson and D. Griffeath, Ann. Probab. 9, 173 (1981).
[15] R. A. Holley, T. M. Liggett, et al., Ann. Probab. 3, 643 (1975).
[16] L. E. Blume, Game Econ. Behav. 5, 387 (1993).
[17] J. Poncela, J. Go´mez-Garden˜es, L. Florı´a, and Y. Moreno, New
J. Phys. 9, 184 (2007).
[18] M. Newman, Networks: An Introduction (Oxford University
Press, Oxford, 2010).
[19] E. Lieberman, C. Hauert, and M. A. Nowak, Nature 433, 312
(2005).
[20] M. Broom and J. Rycht, Proc. R. Soc. A 464, 2609 (2008).
[21] M. Broom, C. Hadjichrysanthou, and J. Rycht, Proc. R. Soc. A
466, 1327 (2010).
[22] S. Tan, J. Lu, and G. Setti, in IECON 2011–37th Annual
Conference on IEEE Industrial Electronics Society (IEEE, New
York, 2011). pp. 4024–4028.
[23] M. Perc, J. Go´mez-Garden˜es, A. Szolnoki, L. M. Florı´a, and
Y. Moreno, J. R. Soc. Interface 10, 80 (2013).
[24] G. Szabo´ and C. To˝ke, Phys. Rev. E 58, 69 (1998).
[25] A. Traulsen, M. A. Nowak, and J. M. Pacheco, Phys. Rev. E 74,
011909 (2006).
[26] B. Wu, C. S. Gokhale, L. Wang, and A. Traulsen, J. Math. Biol.
64, 803 (2012).
[27] L. A. Imhof, D. Fudenberg, and M. A. Nowak, Proc. Natl. Acad.
Sci. USA 102, 10797 (2005).
[28] C. E. Tarnita, H. Ohtsuki, T. Antal, F. Fu, and M. A. Nowak, J.
Theor. Biol. 259, 570 (2009).
[29] T. Antal, S. Redner, and V. Sood, Phys. Rev. Lett. 96, 188104
(2006).
[30] C. Hadjichrysanthou, M. Broom, and J. Rychta´rˇ, Dynam. Games
Appl. 1, 386 (2011).
[31] H. Ohtsuki and M. A. Nowak, Proc. R. Soc. B 273, 2249 (2006).
[32] T. Antal and I. Scheuring, B. Math. Biol. 68, 1923 (2006).
[33] P. M. Altrock and A. Traulsen, New J. Phys. 11, 013012 (2009).
[34] A. Traulsen, J. C. Claussen, and C. Hauert, Phys. Rev. Lett. 95,
238701 (2005).
[35] H. M. Taylor and S. Karlin, An Introduction to Stochastic
Modeling (Academic Press, New York, 1994).
[36] M. A. Nowak and K. Sigmund, Science 303, 793 (2004).
[37] A. Szolnoki and M. Perc, Europhys. Lett. 92, 38003 (2010).
[38] A. E. Roth and J. H. Kagel, The Handbook of Experimental
Economics, Vol. 1 (Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ,
1995).
[39] E. Fehr and S. Ga¨chter, Nature 415, 137 (2002).
[40] J. Garcı´a and A. Traulsen, PLoS ONE 7, e35287 (2012).
[41] H. Brandt, C. Hauert, and K. Sigmund, Proc. R. Soc. B 270,
1099 (2003).
[42] A. Szolnoki, G. Szabo´, and L. Czako´, Phys. Rev. E 84, 046106
(2011).
[43] C. Hauert, S. De Monte, J. Hofbauer, and K. Sigmund, J. Theor.
Biol. 218, 187 (2002).
[44] C. Hauert, S. De Monte, J. Hofbauer, and K. Sigmund, Science
296, 1129 (2002).
[45] A. Szolnoki, G. Szabo´, and M. Perc, Phys. Rev. E 83, 036101
(2011).
[46] A. Szolnoki and M. Perc, Phys. Rev. X 3, 041021 (2013).
[47] G. Szabo´ and G. Fath, Phys. Rep. 446, 97 (2007).
[48] M. Perc and A. Szolnoki, BioSystems 99, 109 (2010).
[49] F. C. Santos and J. M. Pacheco, Phys. Rev. Lett. 95, 098104
(2005).
[50] H. Ohtsuki and M. A. Nowak, J. Theor. Biol. 243, 86 (2006).
[51] S. S. Jakob, C. Heibl, D. Roedder, and F. R. Blattner, Mol. Ecol.
19, 1423 (2010).
[52] S. P. Otto and M. C. Whitlock, Genetics 146, 723 (1997).
[53] S. Gubbins and C. A. Gilligan, Proc. R. Soc. B 266, 2539 (1999).
[54] W. J. Bond and J. J. Midgley, Oikos 73, 79 (1995).
042726-12
